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Introduction
In a recent contribution, Stiglitz (2015) discusses the importance of Frank Ramsey's 1927 classic paper on optimal taxation; referring to it as "brilliant" and a paper that "can be thought of as launching the …eld of optimal taxation and revolutionising public …nance" (p. 1). Nevertheless, Stiglitz goes on to conclude his paper's Introduction by this observation "... later analyses showed crucial quali…cations, so that the policy relevance of Ramsey's analysis may be limited". This paper calls for a reexamination of these "quali…cations". They, we shall argue, stem from a Mirrleesian approach to optimal taxation that ignores public …rms' break-even constraints. Yet, in practice, regulation is almost always associated with budget balancing requirement. A fact that has not escaped the attention of regulatory pricing literature forming a cornerstone of regulatory economics. 1 Prior to Mirrlees (1971) , the Ramsey tax framework served as a cornerstone of the optimal tax theory. The central question in this literature was that of designing (linear) commodity taxes to collect a given tax revenue. Labor income went generally untaxed or subjected to a linear tax. The main point made in this literature was that, except in very special cases, commodity taxes should not be uniform and that they should be set to balance e¢ ciency and equity considerations. The e¢ ciency aspects manifest themselves most clearly in the inverse-elasticity rules (derived when demand functions, Hicksian or Marshallian are separable). These e¢ ciency-driven tax rules entail a regressive bias in that goods with low price-elasticities are often necessities consumed proportionately more by poorer households. This bias is then mitigated by the equity terms in the tax rules (often appearing as covariance terms). These tend to increase the tax rate on 1 It is a mystery as to why it took the public …nance literature more than four decades and until early 1970s to appreciate Ramsey's (1927) insights. It started with the seminal paper by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and followed by literally hundreds of papers. Baumol and Bradford (1970) and Sandmo (1976) provide an interesting history of this subject. In the original Ramsey problem, individuals are alike and there is no income tax. With heterogeneous individuals, one also allows for a uniform lump-sum tax or rebate (and possibly a linear tax on labor income); see Diamond (1975) .
goods that are consumed proportionately more by richer households.
The Mirrleesian approach posed a serious challenge to the Ramsey tax framework approach and the lessons drawn from it. Mirrlees (1971) argued that the existence or absence of tax instruments must be rationalized on the basis of the informational constraints in the economy. This approach turns the Ramsey tax framework on its head by making nonlinear income taxation the most powerful tax instrument at the disposal of the government. In turn, the reliance on the nonlinear income tax has a devastating implication for the usefulness of commodity taxes. In their classic contribution, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) show that under some conditions-weak separability of preferences in labor supply and goods-an optimal nonlinear income tax is su¢ cient to implement any incentive compatible Pareto-e¢ cient allocation. In other words, commodity taxes are redundant (or should be uniform). The Ramsey results come about, it is thus argued, merely as an artifact of restricting the income tax to be linear (an ad hoc and inconsistent assumption given the assumed informational structure). The Atkinson and Stiglitz (AS) result has had a tremendous e¤ect in shaping the views of public economists concerning the design of optimal tax systems: In particular that prices should not be used for redistribution (even in a second best setting), and that in-kind transfers are not useful. 2 A prominent public economics specialist summarizes his and the prevailing view in the literature this way: "Once we add the nonlinear income tax, if we keep homogeneous preferences and weak separability of labor, we have the following generalized view:
The equity-e¢ ciency tradeo¤ associated with income taxation is addressed with the 2 It is by now well understood though that the AS result also has its own limitations. In particular, it may not hold under uncertainty (Cremer and Gahvari, 1995) or under multi-dimensional heterogeneity Ladoux, 1998, and Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet, 2001 ) and redistribution through prices may then once again be second-best optimal 2002) . Still, these limitations notwithstanding, it is fair to say that the Ramsey approach to taxation is considered as dated and no longer "state of the art". It does continue to occupy a prominent place in all advanced textbooks, but it is taught mainly as an introduction to tax design and not because of its practical relevance.
income tax (as done by Mirrlees) , and we should follow Economics 101 …rst-best rules in other realms: uniform commodity taxes (so as not to distort consumption), public goods according to the Samuelson rule, marginal cost pricing, and so forth" (private correspondence).
This strong view notwithstanding, the Ramsey-type rules have had a more or less independent second-or some might argue …rst-life as a model of regulatory pricing. 3 In his pioneering paper that appeared prior to Mirrlees (1971) , Boiteux (1956) studied linear pricing of a regulated multi-product monopoly that has to cover some "…xed cost"
(for instance the infrastructure cost of the network). This is to be achieved through markups on the monopoly's di¤erent products (equivalent to taxes). 4 Formally, this problem is equivalent to a Ramsey tax model with the …xed cost playing the role of the government's tax revenue requirement.
To sum, optimal tax and regulatory pricing literatures appear to have diverged in the way they view the practical relevance of the AS result (see Section 2.1 below). Whereas Ramsey pricing is considered totally passé in the optimal tax literature (even by Econ 101 standard according to our earlier quote from a prominent expert), Ramsey-type lessons permeate the …eld of regulatory economics. This is quite surprising considering the fact that the issues the two literatures address have an identical formal structure.
In both cases, there is a public authority whose objective is to raise a …xed amount of revenue (where the revenue …nances the government's expenditures in the optimal tax literature and the …rms' …xed costs in the regulation literature). 5 This paper is thus also an attempt to reconcile these divergent views and bring them together. To this 3 While it is true that regulators and especially competition authorities are often reluctant to accept Ramsey pricing arguments, this is not because of the AS result. Their objection is more of legal and procedural nature. In particular, Ramsey prices are often viewed as "discriminatory" and subject to informational problems when the operator is better informed about demand condition than the regulator. 4 We follow the terminology used in the regulation literature but, in reality, this is a quasi-…xed cost relevant also in the long-run (a non convexity in the production set). 5 Redistributive concerns are not con…ned to the tax literature and also appear in the regulatory economics literature.
end, we incorporate the regulatory economics focus on budget balance into a Mirrleesian optimal tax framework. As far as we know, a comprehensive analysis of this sort has not been attempted before.
The optimal tax setting we consider combines nonlinear income taxation with linear taxation/pricing of consumption goods. The informational structure that underlies this setting is now standard in the Mirrleesian optimal taxation literature. First, individuals'earning abilities and labor supplies are not publicly observable, but their pre-tax incomes are. This rules out type-speci…c lump-sum taxes but allows for nonlinear income taxation. Second, individual consumption levels of goods, whether subject to regulation or not, are not observable so that nonlinear taxation and/or pricing of goods are not possible. On the other hand, anonymous transactions are observable making linear commodity taxation feasible.
To account for the regulatory economics balanced budget concerns, we assume that a subset of the goods are produced by a public or regulated …rm that has to cover a …xed cost through markups on the di¤erent commodities it sells. 6 This latter constraint gives rise to a "break-even"constraint on the part of the …rm. This comes on top of the overall government's budget constraint. In other words, while our setting is that of AS, we depart from the existing optimal tax literature by formally incorporating a binding break-even in our model. Break-even constraints are fundamental to the regulatory pricing literature; yet somehow they have been overlooked in the optimal tax literature.
We draw on this literature to show that there exist good justi…cations for imposing such a constraint. Some are due to informational issues pertaining to the opportunity to invest in a given sector or the incentives to reduce costs. 7 While we optimize over all tax instruments including income, we are not concerned 6 Whether this …rm is public, as in Boiteux's world, or private but regulated does not matter. Either way, one implicitly assumes that the …rms'revenues must also cover some "fair"rate of return on capital. 7 We will not formally model these type of informational asymmetries in this paper. However, we shall return to this issue in the Conclusion and provide some indication on how our results would be a¤ected if this extra source of information asymmetry were considered.
with the properties of the income tax schedule. Our aim is to solely study the commodity taxation and pricing rules (for goods produced by public/regulated …rms as well as those produced subject to no regulation). We derive these rules for general preferences but concentrate on the case of weakly-separable preferences between labor supply and goods that underlies the AS result. We shall refer to this environment as the AS setting/framework/model and contrast it with the Ramsey environment wherein all tax instruments are linear. The fundamental contribution of our paper is that the AS setting with a break-even constraint restores many of the traditional Ramsey tax/pricing features that have been questioned by modern optimal tax theory.
Speci…cally, we demonstrate that, given a break-even constraint, not only is it desirable to tax the goods produced by the public/regulated …rm but also other goods.
Intuitively, taxation of privately-produced goods are generally needed to o¤set the distortions created by the public/regulated …rm's departure from marginal cost pricing.
This result stands in sharp contrast to AS result on the redundancy of commodity taxes.
We then illustrate and elaborate on our …ndings by studying a simple framework with one publicly-provided and two privately-provided goods.
To interpret our results, and for comparison purposes, we also recast and derive the pricing rules for a setting wherein nonlinear income taxation is ruled out, and taxes and markups are used to …nance both a revenue requirement and a …xed cost (rather than only one of the two as is traditionally done in Ramsey models). While this yields predictable results and is not of much interest in itself, it is a useful reference point.
It encapsulates the e¤ects of imposing a break-even constraint in a Ramsey setting and thus serves as a benchmark for understanding and interpreting our results (derived for the AS setting with a break-even constraint). We present this benchmark as an Appendix to the paper. Comparing the results derived in our setting to those in this benchmark highlights and isolates the role that commodity taxes do play in the AS setting (contrary to the AS's own "no role" result).
The two special cases of independent Hicksian and independent Marshallian demand curves provide further insights into the nature of the tax/pricing rules in our model.
In the separable Hicksian demand case, we …nd that private goods (not included in the break-even constraint) should go untaxed. On the other hand, public …rms should follow pricing rules that are purely e¢ ciency-driven and Ramsey type: Goods are taxed inversely to their compensated demand elasticity regardless of their distributional implications. Redistribution is taken care of by the income tax (allowing public …rms'prices to be adjusted for revenue raising as in the Ramsey model with identical individuals). This is to be contrasted with today's prevailing view-based on the AS framework that ignores break-even constraints-that commodity taxes are redundant. It also di¤ers from earlier Ramsey pricing views that commodity taxes should follow inverse elasticity rules adjusted for redistributive concerns.
Results become less predictable in the case where Marshallian demands are independent. Here, allowing for a break-even constraint in the AS framework, resurrects a role for commodity taxes that go beyond the goods produced subject to the break-even constraint. Instead, it spills over to the taxation of other goods as well. One continues to get inverse elasticity rules as in the Ramsey model; however, their structure di¤ers from the traditional expressions in the Ramsey model. On the one hand, they are more complicated than the pure e¢ ciency rules. On the other hand, there is no covariance (or similar) term that captures redistributive considerations. Instead, they contain "tax revenue terms" that measure the social value of the extra tax revenues generated from demand variations that follow the (compensating) adjustments in disposable income. These terms lead to predictions that are similar to those coming from the many-household Ramsey model albeit without redistributive concerns; namely, that goods with higher demand elasticities should be taxed more heavily. 
The model
There are H types of individuals, indexed j = 1; 2 : : : ; H, who di¤er in their wages, w j , but have identical preferences over goods and leisure. 8 All goods are produced at a constant marginal cost which we normalize to one. Some, x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n ), are produced by the private sector; the rest, y = (y 1 ; y 2 ; : : : ; y m ) are produced by a public or regulated …rm which incurs a …xed cost. The …rm is constrained to break even by marking up its marginal costs. 9 Let p = (p 1 ; p 2 ; : : : ; p n ) denote the consumer price of x and q = (q 1 ; q 2 ; : : : ; q n ) the consumer price of y. Finally, denote the commodity tax rates on x by t = (t 1 ; t 2 ; : : : ; t n ) and the public …rms' commodity-tax-cum-markups by = ( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; m ): We have p i = 1 + t i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) and q s = 1 + s (s = 1; 2; : : : ; m).
Individual consumption levels are not publicly observable but anonymous transactions can be observed. Consequently, commodity taxes must be proportional and public sector prices are linear. For the remaining variables, the information structure is the one typically considered in mixed taxation models; see e.g., Christiansen (1984) and Cremer and Gahvari (1997) . In particular, an individual's type, w j , and labor input, L j , are not publicly observable; his before-tax income, I j = w j L j , on the other hand, is. Consequently, type-speci…c lump-sum taxation is ruled out but non-linear taxation of incomes is feasible. 8 Our results will not change if a continuous distribution of types are considered. 9 Alternatively one can think of a privately owned regulated …rm whose prices are set to cover cost plus a fair rate of return on capital.
To characterize the (constrained) Pareto-e¢ cient allocations we derive an optimal revelation mechanism. For our purpose, a mechanism consists of a set of type-speci…c before-tax incomes, I j s, aggregate expenditures on private sector and public sector goods, c j s, and two vectors of consumer prices (same for everyone) p and q (for x and y). To proceed further, it is necessary to consider the optimization problem of an individual for a given mechanism (p; q; c; I). Formally, given any vector (p; q; c; I), an individual of type j maximizes utility u = u x; y; I=w j subject to the budget constraint
The resulting conditional demand functions for x and y are denoted by x i = x i p; q; c; I=w j and y s = y s p; q; c; I=w j . 10 Substituting in the utility function yields the conditional indirect utility function v p; q; c; I=w j u x p; q; c; I=w j ; y p; q; c; I=w
Thus, a j-type individual who is assigned c j ; I j will have demand functions and an indirect utility function given by
Similarly, the demand functions and the indirect utility function for a j-type who claims to be of type k; the so-called mimicker, is given by
1 0 These demand functions are derived conditional on a given I. Hence the conditional quali…er.
The break-even constraint
The information structure posited above describes only the informational asymmetries between the tax administration and the taxpayers typically assumed in the optimal tax literature. This does not rationalize a break-even constraint which is the missing link between the optimal tax and regulatory economics literatures. In settings where tax policy is restricted only by informational considerations of this type, break-even constraints could be undone by simple lump-sum transfers from the government to the
operators. Yet, in practice, regulation is almost always associated with budget balancing requirements. Which explains why they form a cornerstone of regulatory economics.
Break-even constraints in regulatory economics
Ramsey-Boiteux (RB) pricing continues to play an important role in the sectors still subject to some form of regulation even though, over the last few decades, the scope of regulation has declined. A prominent example is the postal sector in the US where (public authority) and the …rms. This is in contrast with the informational asymmetries between the tax administration (public authority) and the workers (taxpayers) that are at the heart of the optimal tax literature. Finally, the idea that prices ought to be used for redistributive purposes is the rational for a great deal of regulatory policies including social tari¤s and more generally universal service requirements; see Cremer Rather, they appear to seek a set of prices that are not unduly discriminatory but that permit total revenue to cover total cost."
Rationalizing break-even constraints
Going beyond this near axiomatic view of break-even constraints, there are both informational and non-informational grounds that can rationalize them. Political economy considerations provide an obvious example for the latter. Public authorities are typically reluctant to …nance a structural de…cit in a given sector through subsidies from the general budget. For example, voters may consider it to be more "fair" to have natural gas users pay for the transportation costs associated with the network of pipelines and pumping stations (as compared to the taxpayers). Legal issues provide another reason.
In the EU, for instance, "State Aid"is illegal: Member states are not allowed to …nance their operators'de…cits through subsidies. 11 The information-based rationalizations are not explicitly addressed in our setting.
These are summarized by La¤ont and Tirole (1993, pp 23-30) . They give two basic arguments. One, which they ascribe to Coase (1945 Coase ( , 1946 , applies to "a …rm or a product whose existence is not a forgone conclusion". Unless an activity at least breaks even, one cannot be sure that its production is bene…cial for the society to warrant the government covering its …xed costs. Roughly speaking, Coase argues that, absent a budget constraint, the government is entrusted to make this decision without having the appropriate information. With a break-even constraint, this decision is e¤ectively made by consumers who thereby reveal if their willingness to pay for the product is su¢ ciently high. The second argument is related to incentives associated with informational asymmetries between the regulator and the …rm (which we do not formally model). 12 For instance, Allais (1947) has argued that the absence of a break-even constraint would create "inappropriate incentives for cost reduction".
Constrained Pareto-e¢ cient allocations
Denote the government's external revenue requirement by R and the …xed costs of public …rms by F: Constrained Pareto-e¢ cient allocations are described, indirectly, as follows. 13 Maximize
1 1 Unless the aid comes as a compensation for speci…c public-service obligations imposed on an operator. The State Aid legislation is in turn motivated by anti-trust considerations and speci…cally the concern that member states might subsidize their "national champion". 1 2 We discuss this issue further in the Conclusion. 1 3 Indirectly because the optimization is over a mix of quantities and prices. Then, given the commodity prices, utility maximizing individuals would choose the quantities themselves.
with respect to p; q; c j and I j where j s are constants with the normalization P H j=1 j = 1. 14 The maximization is subject to the resource constraint
the break-even constraint
and the self-selection constraints v j v jk ; j; k = 1; 2; : : : ; H:
Denote the Lagrangian expression by L, and the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the resource constraint (8) by ; the public …rms'break-even constraint (9) by , and with the self-selection constraints (10) by jk . We have
The …rst-order conditions of this problem with respect to I j ; c j , for j; k = 1; 2; : : : ; H, and p i ; q s , for i = 2; 3; : : : ; n, and s = 1; 2; : : : ; m, characterize the Pareto-e¢ cient allocations constrained both by the public …rms' break-even constraint, the resource constraint, the self-selection constraints, as well as the linearity of commodity tax rates (see the paragraph below as to why the optimization does not extend to i = 1). They are derived in Appendix A. 15 The reason that we do not optimize over p 1 is well-known in the optimal tax literature. With x and y being homogeneous of degree zero in p; q; and c; consumer prices can determined only up to a proportionality factor. Consequently, one of the consumer prices must be normalized. We choose p 1 and set its value at p 1 = 1. 16 Having stated this, a caveat is in order. In the absence of the break-even constraint, the normalization of one of the consumer prices is without any loss of generality. In our setting, the fact that consumer prices can be determined only up to a proportionality factor implies, at …rst glance, that the break-even constraint may be rendered inconsequential. This is the idea that the government can always raise all prices proportionately to cover the breakeven constraint of the public …rm! However, imposing a binding break-even constraint also rules out the possibility of an across the board uniform increase in all consumer prices, including those of the public …rm, for the revenues of the public …rm to cover its …xed costs. Indeed, such an across the board increases in all prices is in contradiction with the very idea of imposing a break-even constraint in the …rst place. This "policy" will never work when there are multiple …rms with di¤erent cost structures. 17 
Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem and optimal commodity taxes
In the standard mixed taxation model without the break-even constraint, assuming preferences are weakly separable in goods and labor supply, the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) theorem on the redundancy of commodity taxes holds. The particular feature of separability that drives the AS result is the property that a j-type who pretends to be 1 6 Observe that with p1 = 1, one can replace 1 7 Suppose there are two public …rms. Refer to the one which has a relatively higher …xed cost as #1 and the other as #2. Raising prices proportionately to balance the budget of #1 must imply that #2 will have a surplus, while raising them to balance the budget of #2 must imply that #1 will have a de…cit.
of type k will have the same demand as type k. That is,
This arises because with weak-separability, preferences take the following form u = u f x; y ; I=w j . Under this circumstance, the (conditional) demand functions for x and y speci…ed in equations (1)- (2) and (4)- (5) will be independent of I=w j so that x i = x i p; q; c and y s = y s p; q; c . Moreover, the indirect utility function too will be weakly separable in p; q; c and I=w j and written as v p; q; c ; I=w j :
The above property has far reaching implications for optimal commodity taxes in our setting too; both those produced by the public …rm as well as privately. To derive these, introduce the compensated version of demand functions (1)- (2). Speci…cally, denote the compensated demand for a good by a "tilde"over the corresponding variable. 
We prove in Appendix A that in this case optimal commodity taxes satisfy the following 
The implication of equation (15) implies all ts and all s are zero. Nor will it be the case that the ts are necessarily zero.
This point, that the existence of a break-even point requires not only the taxation of goods produced by the public …rm but also the taxation of privately-provided goods, constitutes the major lesson of our study.
The second important lesson we are seeking to answer is the extent to which the pricing rules de…ned by (15) resemble the traditional Ramsey rules. Traditionally, however, the Ramsey pricing rules are derived for either a uni…ed government budget constraint (in the public …nance literature), or for a public …rm (in the regulation literature), but not for the two together as we have done here. Adding on a break-even constraint to the government's budget constraint in the Ramsey problem, however, does not change the structure of Ramsey taxes/pricing rules. This is easy to show. For completeness, and to establish a benchmark for comparison, we do this and report it in Appendix B.
The counterpart to (15) in the Ramsey model with break-even constraint is equation
The most striking di¤erence between the two sets of results is the lack of any distributional considerations (15) . 19 This constitutes the second important lesson of our study: The tax/pricing rules for both types of goods, those that are produced privately and those that are provided through the public …rm, are not a¤ected by redistribution concerns. It is important to note that this statement concerns tax rules as opposed to tax levels which will obviously be a¤ected.
To gain further insights into the nature of commodity taxes in (15), we next resort to a simple special case with one private-sector and one public-sector good.
Two privately-produced goods, one public
Under this simple structure, and with t 1 = 0; t 2 and 1 are found from equation (15) to
They appear in (B8) through j .
It immediately follows from the above that
The break-even condition increases the price of y 1 above its marginal cost so that its consumption is less than optimal. One attempts to reverse this through t 2 . As a general lesson, taxation of privately-produced goods are necessitated to o¤ set the distortions created by having to depart from marginal cost pricing on the part of the public …rm. 20 To gain a better intuition into the nature of the tax/pricing rules in our model, we next consider the two well-known special cases for which the Ramsey setting yields simple results. These are the independent Hicksian and Marshallian demand curves The appearance of the = term on the right-hand side of this relationship re ‡ects the fact that "average-cost pricing"by public …rms creates an additional source of distortion beyond the tax distortion caused purely for revenue raising. Whereas the shadow cost of raising one unit of revenue for covering R is , it is + for covering F . It is, relative to , = higher.
(i) Commodity taxes are desirable. Optimal commodity taxes are characterized by (15) .
(ii) Break-even constraints for public/regulated …rms have spill overs to other goods; they should be taxed too. These taxes are necessitated to o¤ set the distortions created by having to depart from marginal cost pricing on the part of the public …rm.
(iii) The tax/pricing rules for both types of goods, those that are produced privately and those that are provided through the public …rm, are not a¤ ected by redistribution concerns.
Constrained Pareto e¢ cient pricing rules 4.1 Zero cross-price compensated elasticities
Assume that Hicksian demands are independent so that the compensated demand of any produced good does not depend on the prices of the other produced goods. In this case, the reduced Slutsky matrix (where the line and column pertaining to leisure is deleted) is diagonal so that equation (15) 
which is an inverse elasticity rule. Again, the inverse elasticity rule arises only because of the existence of the break-even constraint. In the absence of this constraint, = 0 so that s , for all s = 1; 2; : : : ; m, will also be equal to zero.
The next question concerns the di¤erence between our results of t = 0 and characterized by equation (16) commodity taxes is "e¢ ciency". There will be no tax on private goods while the goods provided by the public form are subject to the inverse elasticity rule that re ‡ect pure e¢ ciency considerations; see equation (16) .
To sum, we …nd that in this special case, the private goods (not included in the break-even constraint) continue to go untaxed as in the Atkinson-Stiglitz setting with no break-even constraint. On the other hand, the pricing rules used by the public …rm are purely e¢ ciency-driven Ramsey rules. Goods are taxed inversely to their compensated demand elasticity regardless of their distributional implications. Redistribution is taken care of by the income tax allowing the public …rm's prices to be adjusted for revenue raising (as in the Ramsey model with identical individuals).
It will become clear below that the apparent simplicity of this rule is to some extent misleading. It obscures some e¤ects which are present but happen to cancel out in this special case. We shall return to this issue in the next subsections.
Zero cross-price elasticities
We now turn to the case where Marshallian demand functions are independent so that the demand for any given good does not depend on the prices of other (produced) goods. 21 To simplify the pricing rules that obtain in this case, it is simpler to start from the intermediate expressions (A10)-(A11) given in Appendix A rather than from (15) . Rearranging these expressions, making use of the weak-separability assumption, and setting all the cross-price derivatives equal to zero, we obtain for all i = 2; : : : ; n and s = 1; 2; : : : ; m; 
Before simplifying these expressions any further, it is informative to delve into their interpretation. Recall that we are considering a compensated variation in the tax rates such that dc j = x j i dt i for a variation in t i and dc j = y j s dq s for a variation in s . In other words, individual disposable incomes are adjusted to keep utility levels constant for all individuals. With utility levels unchanged, the impact of the variation on social welfare entirely depends on the extra tax revenue (or pro…t) it generates. The left-hand sides of (17)- (18) measure the social value of this extra tax revenue (for a variation in t i or in s respectively). Obviously, when the tax system is optimized, this social value must be equal to zero (otherwise welfare could be increased by changing the tax rates).
To understand this interpretation, assume one changes c j after t i or s changes.
Start with a variation in t i . With the tax revenues being given by
and the cross-price derivatives being equal to zero, the change in t i produces an extra
Our compensation rule requires P j j x j i of this to be rebated to individuals. 22 The net change in revenue, minus compensation, is equal to
This is the …rst expression on the left-hand side of (17) . At the same time, the P To convert these tax revenue changes into social welfare (measured in units of general revenues), one must multiply tax revenue variations emanating from y-goods by a factor of (1 + = ): This is because the revenue from y-goods enters both the global government budget constraint as well as the break-even constraint. This results in the second expression on the left-hand side of (17). 2 2 To see this, observe that cj changes according to dcj = x j i dti so that aggregate compensations change by P
The left-hand side of (18) (it comes from the general budget and has no impact on the break even constraint).
To ease the comparison with traditional Ramsey expressions, we can rewrite (17)- (18) as inverse elasticity rules. Introducing
where A i and B s measure the social value of the extra tax revenues due to refunds, with
We have, for all i = 2; : : : ; n and s = 1; 2; : : : ; m;
where and j ii and " j ss denote the absolute value of the j-type's own-price elasticity of Marshallian demands for x i and y s :
Expressions (21)- (22) One may wonder why these terms were absent in Subsection 4.1. The key to understanding this property is that when Hicksian demands are independent, the price-cumincome variations we consider have by de…nition no impact on the demand of any of the other goods. And the e¤ect on the good under consideration is already captured in the (compensated) elasticity term. To sum up, Subsection 4.1 has given simple results, not because the di¤erent e¤ects were absent but because they happen to cancel out exactly under the considered assumptions.
Finally, compare (21)- (22) 
Proportional reduction in compensated demands
When there are cross-price e¤ects, the Ramsey model no longer yields results that can be presented as simple inverse elasticity rules. One popular way to present the tax rules in this case is in terms of proportional reduction in compensated demands. This leads to the celebrated "equal proportional reduction"pure e¢ ciency result in the one-consumer Ramsey problem (and adjusted for redistributive considerations in the many household case).
P n e=1 t e P j j @ỹ
The left-hand side of (23) and (24) The tax rules also include "tax revenue" terms characterized by (19)- (20). (d) These terms measure the social value of the extra tax revenue generated from the demand variations that follow the (compensating) adjustments in disposable income.
(iii) A version of the proportional reduction in compensated demands apply for all goods as characterized by (23) and (24) . The reductions are proportional to the compensated impact of the considered good's tax rate on the break-even constraint and di¤ ers across di¤ erent goods.
Conclusion
This paper has examined if the optimal tax and regulatory pricing approaches to Ramsey pricing can be reconciled. It has incorporated the two objectives of revenue raising for …nancing the government's expenditures (including redistributive transfers) and a regulated …rm's …xed cost into a single framework. Tax instruments were restricted by informational considerations posited in the optimal tax literature and by the …rm's break-even constraint as stipulated in the regulatory economics. It has argued that in practice regulation is almost always associated with balanced budget requirements.
It is thus a shortcoming of the modern optimal tax theory that is based solely on a information structure that precludes break-even constraints. It has discussed a number of reasons for the existence of these constraints and shown that their neglect has led to an warranted view of the role of commodity taxes in the literature.
By incorporating a break-even constraint into the Atkinson and Stiglitz framework, the paper has challenged the modern optimal tax view that considers commodity taxes redundant. It has restored many of the earlier Ramsey tax/pricing lessons within the Atkinson and Stiglitz framework. In particular, it has shown that while nonlinear income taxes does take care of all redistributive concerns, this does not mean that commodity taxes are redundant. Break-even constraints create a role for commodity taxes. Interestingly too, this role goes beyond taxation of goods produced by the public/regulated …rm but to the taxation of other goods as well. Put di¤erently, break-even constraints for "regulated goods" have spill overs to "non-regulated goods".
We conclude by pointing out a number of possible extensions to our study. First, it would be interesting to compare the spill-over e¤ects on the prices of non-regulated goods to the markups imposed on the goods subject to break-even constraints. Our various expressions suggest that this depends mainly on the size of the (compensated) cross-price e¤ects. However, the complex way they operate does not allow one to draw clearcut conclusions at this level of generality. Numerical examples could provide some illustrative indications, while an empirical study may lead to more satisfactory answers.
Second, we have not formally modeled the informational asymmetries between public authorities and the regulated …rm. These have been at the heart of the regulatory economics literature during the last two decades. 23 Rearranging the terms in (11), and dropping the constants R and F; one may usefully rewrite the Lagrangian expression as
The …rst-order conditions of this problem are, for j; k = 1; 2; : : : ; H; 
where a subscript on v j denotes a partial derivative. Equations (A2)-(A5) characterize the Pareto-e¢ cient allocations constrained both by the public …rms' break-even constraint, the resource constraint, the self-selection constraints, as well as the linearity of commodity tax rates.
Derivation of (15) shows the same compensated e¤ect for a variation in q s where
These compensated derivatives, (@L=@p i ) v j =v j and (@L=@q s ) v j =v j vanish at the optimal solution.
Make use of Roy's identity to set, 
Appendix B: The benchmark
The many-consumer Ramsey problem with a break-even constraint An individual of type j now chooses x; y, and L to maximize his utility u = u x; y; L subject to the budget constraint Let j denote the proportion of individuals of type j in the economy and consider a utilitarian social welfare function of the form
where W ( ) is increasing, twice di¤erentiable, and concave. The optimization problem consists of maximizing P j j W v j with respect to p; q; b and subject to resource and break-even constraints (8)- (9) . Observe that with x; y and L being homogeneous of 2 4 Separability of preferences does not simplify the characterization of the unconditional demand and indirect utility functions. If the utility function is separable and is written as U f x; y ; L , all one can do is to write, for a given L, the consumer's demand for x; y as functions of p; q and w
However, optimization over L yields L = L p; q; w j (1 ) ; b . Consequently,
degree zero in p; q; w j (1 ) and b, consumer prices are determined only up to a proportionality factor. It is for this reason that we do not optimize over , setting it equal to zero.
The Lagrangian expression associated with maximizing P j j W v j with respect to p; q; b and subject to constraints (8)- (9) 
Observe that while the structure of taxes on private goods and public …rms'goods are not identical here, the same Ramsey tax/pricing rules apply to both under this setting (as compared to our result in the text given by equation (15)). Observe also that the many-consumer Ramsey problem we have considered as our benchmark here allows for a uniform lump-sum rebate, b: The literature considers this problem for both 2 5 As with , is of full rank so that its inverse exists; see Takayama (1985) .
cases when b is and is not present. The same tax/pricing rules are derived in both cases. The only di¤erence is that when b is present, the optimization over b results in P j j j = 1. This result does not hold when b is not present.
Zero cross-price compensated elasticities
Set the cross-price derivatives in equations (B6)-(B7) equal to zero and rearrange the terms. We have, for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and s = 1; 2; : : : ; m; Then recall from the de…nition of j that we have: j j = P n e=1 t e @x j e =@b +
(1 + = ) P m f =1 f @y j f =@b . Substitute in above and make use of the de…nitions of A i and B s in the text to arrive at the counterparts of (21)- (22) 
